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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for use in designing 
and evaluating safeguards systems for current and future plants in the nuclear power fuel cycle. The DOE 
is engaging several DOE National Laboratories in efforts applied to safeguards for chemical conversion 
plants and gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants. As part of the development, Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory has developed an integrated safeguards system analysis tool (LISSAT). This tool 
provides modeling and analysis of facility and safeguards operations, generation of diversion paths, and 
evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. The constituent elements of diversion scenarios, including 
material extraction and concealment measures, are structured using directed graphs (digraphs) and fault 
trees. Statistical analysis evaluates the effectiveness of measurement verification plans and randomly 
timed inspections. Time domain simulations analyze significant scenarios, especially those involving 
alternate time ordering of events or issues of timeliness. Such simulations can provide additional 
information to the fault tree analysis and can help identify the range of normal operations and, by 
extension, identify additional plant operational signatures of diversions. LISSAT analyses can be used to 
compare the diversion-detection probabilities for individual safeguards technologies and to inform overall 
strategy implementations for present and future plants.  Additionally, LISSAT can be the basis for a 
rigorous cost-effectiveness analysis of safeguards and design options.  This paper will describe the results 
of a LISSAT analysis of a generic centifuge enrichment plant.  The paper will describe the diversion 
scenarios analyzed and the effectiveness of various safeguards systems alternatives. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has developed an integrated safeguards system analysis tool 
(LISSAT), which is a framework for performing systems analysis of safeguards effectiveness for facilities 
in all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle.  The method has been applied to assess safeguards effectiveness for 
a conversion facility [1], an enrichment facility [2], and for various types of nuclear reactors [3].  LISSAT 
has the potential for evaluating safeguards approaches for future proliferation resistant facilities and 
processes and for evaluating current safeguards tools and methods to assess safeguards strategies beyond 
current methods. 
A particular emphasis of our recent work has been the application of LISSAT to gas-centrifuge plants, 
where strengthening the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of safeguards has been a priority for the 
IAEA. In April 2005, the IAEA hosted a technical meeting in Vienna on April 18-22, 2005 with the aim 
of further strengthening its inspection and verification approaches applied to uranium enrichment 
activities. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for 
potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems and for support of IAEA goals [4, 5]. 
LISSAT is being applied to safeguards problems in the framework of DOE-directed multi-Laboratory 
projects that bring together expertise in plant design, safeguards, and systems analysis [4, 6]. 
The key components of LISSAT include directed graph/fault tree analysis, statistical analysis, and time-
domain simulation as outlined in Figure 1. The directed graph (digraph) fault tree methodology presents a 
well-structured systematic approach for generation and analysis of the diversion paths and is more 
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comprehensive and systematic than traditional safeguards analysis methods. The digraph analysis is an 
effective method to organize and structure the possible diversion activities in a diversion scenario together 
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Figure 1. LLNL Integrated Safeguards System Analysis Tool LISSAT for evaluating the 
the effectiveness of a safeguard system for a nuclear fuel cycle facility 
The fault tree analysis incorporates possible failure modes of the safeguards measures and develops a 
fault tree for the safeguards system taking account of the failure modes. Output of the digraph-fault tree 
analysis provides an identification of the safeguards elements with the greatest potential for reducing the 
probability of diversion of nuclear material. Additional outputs include the ranking of the various 
diversion scenarios in terms of their probability of evading detection. 
Statistical analysis, in addition to providing the basic event probabilities for the fault tree, also is used to 
derive the probability that a given plan of short-notice random inspections will encounter time-clustered 
physical diversion activities and the probability that a given inspection sampling and measurement plan 
will detect complex concealment schemes that combine the use of misdeclarations on some material items 
with deliberate bias in measurements and diversions to the material-unaccounted-for (MUF) balance. 
The most attractive diversion scenarios are selected for time-domain simulation. The continuous event 
simulations track the uranium flow through the enrichment facility. The simulations include normal 
operation, intermediate storage such as in a feed purification system, normal variations of input flow, and 
diversion scenarios.  Simulation outputs are the time series of material outputs, which illustrate the data 
signatures of normal operation and diversion schemes.  The simulation results for diversions reveal 
changes both in the accumulated totals of intermediate and final material production and in the time 
dependence of production.  The amplitude of the results shows how much and how soon the monitored 
signals exceed normal fluctuations.  
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For diversion paths where the analysis indicates an unacceptably high nondetection probability, the results 
of the digraph-fault tree analysis and time-domain simulation can suggest further safeguards measures. 
The fault tree importance analysis can suggest where further redundancy or more reliable instrumentation 
is required.  The results of the simulation help identify the materials that it would be most useful to 
monitor and identify the optimum placement of monitors.  The simulation may also suggest what further 
indicators the inspector could observe.  Digraphs and fault trees are then modified and reanalyzed to 
determine the reduction in the nondetection probability that could be obtained if these additional measures 
were implemented.  In addition the cost of proposed modifications and their intrusiveness on operations 
would also be considered. 
LISSAT analyses can be used to compare the diversion-detection probabilities for individual safeguards 
technologies as well as for overall strategy implementations.  Additionally, LISSAT could be the basis for 
a rigorous cost-effectiveness analysis.  Finally, the simulations could be used on a facility or process level 
to aid inspectors in detecting possible material diversions or difficulties with specific instruments in the 
field.  
The following sections illustrate the application of LISSAT to a reference generic plant for centrifuge 
enrichment, including the evaluation of the benefits of adding specified safeguards enhancements. Plant 
design specifics and safeguards concerns and options were developed in a multi-Laboratory project [6]. 
2. GENERIC CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT PLANT SAFEGUARDS ANALYSIS 
We evaluated current and potential safeguards systems for a generic gaseous centrifuge enrichment plant 
described by Oak Ridge National Laboratory for use in a training course [7]. This is a medium sized plant 
with a capacity of 500 MTSWU per year, with 50 cascades of 250 centrrifuges each, producing product at 
3.5% enrichment. There are several autoclaves for feeding UF6 at natural enrichment into the plant, with 
one in operation at any time. Similarly there are several product and tails withdrawal stations. The 
simulation models the operations of the storage area, the feed, product, and tails stations, and the 
weighing and sampling area, as well as transfers between areas. The cascade hall operation is modeled 
down to the cascade unit. 
There are several safeguards concerns regarding GCEPs, including diversion of low-enriched uranium 
(LEU), excess production of LEU with undeclared feed and product, and  reconfiguration of part of the 
plant to produce HEU [8, 9].  
Among the diversion or misuse scenarios analyzed are the following: 
1. production and diversion of a significant quantity of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by isolating 
several cascades and placing them in series [8] 
2. diversion by skimming of a significant quantity of declared LEU product [2, 8] 
3. production of LEU in excess of declared amounts by using undeclared feed [8, 9] 
 
As an example of the scale for diversion scenario 2, skimming of 2% of the product (equivalent to the 
product of one cascade) over a year will divert 2300 kg of LEU, containing 80 kg of 235U. This is slightly 
above the IAEA significant quantity of LEU, which is LEU containing 75 kg of 235U. 
Two sets of removal nodes were considered for each scenario -- 
• Conventional – Feed, Product and Tails Station 
• Inside Cascade Hall – Feed and Withdrawal Carts Used 
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Three safeguards options were considered for each scenario, one representing current practice and two 
enhancement options that incorporate alternate procedures and equipment, as follows – 
1. Current Practice: Conduct 11 fixed Interim Inventory Inspections (IIVs) per year); hold feed, 
product and tails cylinders for 15 days on average; perform annual Physical Inventory 
Verification (PIV,  1 to 2 weeks on-site, almost no interruption of throughput flow); and perform 
6 Limited-Frequency Unannounced Accesses (LFUAs) inside the cascade hall 
2. Option 2: Use “Mailbox” record keeping; conduct 13 Short-Notice Random Inspections (SNRIs) 
per year (replaces IIVs) [10, 11]; hold product cylinders for 15 days; perform annual PIV; 
implement video surveillance at feed and withdrawal stations (product and tails) [11]; conduct 6 
LFUAs inside the cascade hall; and use Cascade Enrichment Monitor (CEMO) [8] 
3. Option 3: Use all Option 2 measures and also use load cells that weigh the input feed and output 
product and tails [9]. 
IAEA sampling and measurement plans are used for the input and output verification measurements for 
MUF under the Fixed Monthly Inspections (FMIs) or SNRI. Observation measures include inspector 
observations during FMI or SNRIs outside the cascade hall and during LFUA inside the cascade hall. 
Options examined for continuous monitoring are load cells and video cameras at the feed, product, and 
withdrawal stations outside the cascade hall, and continuous enrichment monitors (CEMO) on cascade 
product headers. 
The material acccounting verification plan is based on IAEA sampling and measurement plans, and on 
measurement capabilities taken from Ref. [12]. The observation activities includes inspector activities 
during inspections and continuous unattended video cameras, load cells, and CEMOs. The video cameras 
and load cells preclude attaching undeclared cylinders but do not by themselves preclude tampering with 
declared cylinders after they have been removed from sight of the cameras. 
Directed graphs and fault trees structure the plant activities and safeguards measures and their 
interactions, for each misuse scenario, the feed and withdrawal locations, and the safeguards system 
options. The evaluated fault trees give the scenario non-detection probabilities. The basic-event 
probabilities input to the fault trees are only best estimates and are based on classical sampling statistics 
and generic high-tech industry experience with instrumentation and operations. 
The detection probability for each scenario is indicated in Table 1. Each scenario non-detection 
probability is the product of the material accounting non-detection probability and the inspector 
verification non-detection probability.  Inspector verification refers to all activities other than material 
accounting the inspector performs that are indicative of diversion such as surveillance. To avoid the 
appearance of high precision, the probabilities are binned into ranges. The added safeguards measures in 
Options 2 and 3 improve detection probability for some scenarios, but other scenarios remain only 
partially covered. Further safeguards measures may be indicated. 
The first column in Table 1 lists the scenario, the second column the safeguards option, the third column 
the feed and withdrawal points, the fourth column the material accounting detection probability, the fifth 
column computes verification detection probabilities, and the sixth column is the scenario detection 
probability that combines the material accounting probability and verification activities probability. 
Evaluation of current practice (safeguards option 1)
For the skimming scenarios (2A, 2B), IAEA detection goals (detection probability = 50% or higher) are 
met adequately under safeguards option 1 through the material accounting verification sampling plan. The 
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HEU production scenario (1A, 1B) is covered by the LFUAs, and for the purposes of this generic-plant 
assessment, we assume that the scope of the negotiated LFUAs is adequate to meet the IAEA’s goal. 
Option 1 fails, however, to meet the detection goal in the undeclared feed scenarios (3A and 3B), which 
underscores the need to consider additional measures such as those included in safeguards options 2 and 
3. The Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP), which recommended measures similar to our safeguards 
option 1, did not address the undeclared feed scenario [11]. 
For the HEU production scenario, where safeguards option 1 meets IAEA detection goals, it should be 
noted that material accountancy alone is not sufficient to meet the IAEA detection goal of p = 50%. Thus, 
the LFUAs in the cascade hall are important in verifying that HEU production is not occurring.   
Evaluation of alternative safeguards options
For safeguards options 2 and 3, the use of video camera and SNRIs significantly increases the detection 
probability for the undeclared feed scenario provided that withdrawal occurs outside the cascade hall (3C, 
3E), because this diversion method requires the use of additional, undeclared feed and product cylinders 
that can be observed through video surveillance. The use of CEMO in safeguards options 2 and 3 
significantly increases the detection probability under all scenarios involving HEU production (scenarios 
1C, 1D, 1E, and 1F). 
These alternative options are not able, however, to meet IAEA detection goals under undeclared feed 
scenarios that involve feed and withdrawal locations inside the cascade hall (scenarios 3D and 3F).  The 
only means provided for observing these scenarios is through LFUAs (also used in safeguards option 1)  
when collection carts are used for feed and withdrawal. Because there are only 6 days of non-compliance, 
there is insufficient probability that an LFUA will occur while collection carts are in use.  (The same 
limitation to the power of LFUAs applies to skimming scenarios where withdrawal occurs inside the 
cascade hall, but in these cases, material accountancy is sufficient to offset this limitation.).  We do not 
give any credit for observing piping modifications of these scenarios when LFUAs occur because the 
modifications are minimal in these cases.  What is needed is an independent measurement or portal 
surveillance to indicate feed and withdrawal inside the cascade hall. 
Another observed limitation in the evaluated safeguards proposals applies to diversion of product 
cylinders.  Scenarios that particularly apply are 2C and 2E. Under the safeguards options we evaluated, 
cylinders are visually counted and/or weighed but their identity is not verified.  If product cylinders are 
replaced by bogus cylinders with duplicated serial numbers, the only means to detect this substitution is 
by the traditional sampling for gross and partial defects or by improved cylinder IDs.  For safeguards 
options 2 and 3, the total number of cylinders processed must equal the number of cylinders declared by 
the operator, otherwise item anomalies would be generated. 
3. PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the result of our analysis of a generic  500 MTSWU per year facility, preliminary recommendations 
were made to enhance safeguards at gas-centrifuge enrichment plants. Proposed safeguards options 2 and 
3 provide significant improvement in detection probability for certain diversion or misuse scenarios. 
Further,  improved cylinder IDs [8] such as RFID tags [9] should be placed on product cylinders that can  
not be easily modified or removed from the cylinder.  In addition, the operator should apply IAEA seals 
to product cylinders sent to the product storage area, as is done now in some applications [13]. This 
measure would detect the operator shipping a bogus cylinder in place of the product cylinder when 
cylinders are examined at the receiving facility. The generic facility has valves inside the cascade hall that 
can be used as feed and withdrawal points for any of the three scenarios described above.  It would be 





















1A – HEU Production 1 normal -- feed and withdrawal Some Adequate Adequate 
1B – HEU Production 1 inside cascade hall Some Adequate Adequate 
1C – HEU Production 2 normal -- feed and withdrawal Some Very high Very high 
1D – HEU Production 2 inside cascade hall Some Very high Very high 
1E – HEU Production 3 normal -- feed and withdrawal Some Very high Very high 
1F – HEU Production 3 inside cascade hall Some Very high Very high 
      
2A – Skimming 1 normal -- feed and withdrawal Adequate None Adequate 
2B – Skimming 1 inside cascade hall Adequate Some Adequate 
2C – Skimming 2 normal -- feed and withdrawal Adequate Some Adequate 
2D – Skimming 2 inside cascade hall Adequate Some Adequate 
2E – Skimming 3 normal -- feed and withdrawal Adequate Some Adequate 
2F – Skimming 3 inside cascade hall Adequate Some Adequate 
      
3A – Undeclared Feed 1 normal -- feed and withdrawal None None None 
3B – Undeclared Feed 1 inside cascade hall None Some Some 
3C – Undeclared Feed 2 normal -- feed and withdrawal None Very high Very high 
3D – Undeclared Feed 2 inside cascade hall None Some Some 
3E – Undeclared Feed 3 normal -- feed and withdrawal None Very high Very high 
3F – Undeclared Feed 3 inside cascade hall None Some Some 
 
Table 1 – Scenario detection probabilities for 18 different cases. The probabilities are only best estimates and are based on classical sampling 
statistics and generic high-tech industry experience with instrumentation and operations. “Adequate” means the measures meet the IAEA goal, in 
this case with a detection probability of 50% to 90%. “Some” means less than adequate for the goal. “Very high” means in the range of 99% or 
higher. The added safeguards measures improve detection probability for some scenarios, but other scenarios remain only partially covered. 
Further safeguards measures may be indicated. 
 
 the cascade hall, placing them instead in an easily monitored common room. This latter approach was 
used, for example, in the design of the Louisiana Enrichment Services National Enrichment Facility [14]. 
These recommendations are based on structured logical analysis, statistics, and general high-tech industry 
experience. Additional inputs would be needed before taking actual decisions about safeguards 
approach, including an evaluation of the uncertainty in the probability values, and elicitation of 
further expert judgment that could be folded into a refined logical analysis. Future efforts are 
directed toward determining the safeguards effectivenss of a real time accounting system that would 
measure feed inputs and product and tails outputs and as a result, reduce the number of inspector days. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
LISSAT provides an integrated analysis capability for evaluating proposed and potential future safeguards 
systems for facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle. The directed graph (digraph)/fault tree analysis provides a 
systematic approach to structure the moves and countermoves in a diversion/safeguards interaction. This 
analysis helps quantify the change in probability of detection of a diversion due to the introduction of new 
safeguards procedures or technology. Significant scenarios can be transferred to time domain simulation, 
especially those scenarios involving alternate time ordering of events or issues of timeliness. The 
simulation can provide additional information to the fault tree analysis and can help identify additional 
plant operational signatures that might assist inspectors as indicators of diversion or misuse. The complete 
analysis system can provide information on the relative operational and cost effectiveness of proposed 
safeguards procedures and technology and plant design features. The LISSAT system provided a 
structured framework for multi-laboratory projects for extending safeguards to uranium chemical 
purification and conversion plants and to GCEPs. Applications for safeguards at GCEPs and nuclear 
power reactors are continuing. 
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